The world does not need words. It articulates itself
in sunlight, leaves, and shadows. The stones on the path
are no less real for lying uncatalogued and uncounted.
The fluent leaves speak only the dialect of pure being.
The kiss is still fully itself though no words were spoken.
And one word transforms it into something less or other—
illicit, chaste, perfunctory, conjugal, covert.
Even calling it a kiss betrays the fluster of hands
glancing the skin or gripping a shoulder, the slow
arching of neck or knee, the silent touching of tongues.
Yet the stones remain less real to those who cannot
name them, or read the mute syllables graven in silica.
To see a red stone is less than seeing it as jasper—
metamorphic quartz, cousin to the flint the Kiowa
carved as arrowheads. To name is to know and remember.
The sunlight needs no praise piercing the rainclouds,
painting the rocks and leaves with light, then dissolving
each lucent droplet back into the clouds that engendered it.
The daylight needs no praise, and so we praise it always—
greater than ourselves and all the airy words we summon.
from Interrogations at Noon
© 2001 Dana Gioia
Friday, June 27, 2008
Thursday, June 26, 2008
Catholic Experience and Contraception
A recent comment I posted on the thread to this post:
"Having foundered on fundamental disagreements regarding first principles, it seems that this discussion has inevitably turned to an existential exchange of claims regarding the "authenticity" of Church doctrines on contraception, especially insofar as those doctrines have an "experiential" basis.
While a combox is rarely a suitable form for this sort of existential discourse (one's college dorm discussions at least took place with actual people, with whom one lived and regularly interacted), it seems that there is perhaps some benefit to discussing the "real" experiences of Catholics in regard to the matter. Moreover, it seems the commenters in this thread who seem the most concerned about "hearing the voices of women" on the issue, are in fact very poorly acquainted with any actual Catholics, men or women, who have accepted the Church's stance on these matters. With that in mind, I offer the following thoughts:
My wife is a cradle Catholic who grew up, like most women of her generation, being taught that "theological development [should be] based on the actual experiences of men and women rather than on the ideal experience that no one has." Upon leaving her parents' house, she followed that premise to its natural conclusion, and promptly left the Church, a pattern her two sisters repeated also, and which was shared by most women of their generation. Naturally, she rejected the Church's teaching on contraceptive acts, both in theory and in practice. However, a time came in her life when she was forced to re-evaluate her relationship to the Church, as well as consider the significance and status of its teachings on contraception. The interesting part of her story is that she was firm in her rejection of the former until careful study of the latter. Her reconciliation with the Church came only through an acceptance of the Church's teaching on the meaning of the marital act. Indeed, it was a close reading of Humanae Vitae (from a tract containing an introductory essay by the aforementioned Janet Smith) that first captured her moral imagination on the subject. In understanding the Church's teaching on the meaning of the human person, and its embodiment in the most intimate of human acts, as well as its "obstinacy" in the face of popular opinion on the matter, she came to realize that, just perhaps, the Church had a vision for human existence that is somewhat deeper than the cultural currents of our time.
We now live in a suburb of St Paul, MN, and she is connected to a wide network of Catholic familes, nearly all of whom accept the Church's teachings on contraception, with varying degrees of understanding and practice. Interestingly, the women and families with whom she is connected here make up the majority of mass-attending Catholics at their respective parishes, at least for their generational group. For none of them is the "rhythm method" the "sacred pillar of Catholic identity," and none of those women would recognize the snide and facile conflation of theology and practice that lies behind such remarks. Indeed, most of them are adamant about the fact that they do not practice the "rhythm method," and are equally adamant about the non-negotiable role of the Church's teachings on contraception, especially as it shapes their own lives and marital acts. Most of them see and understand, even if they cannot fully articulate it, the right order of theology and practice in this area, and choose to not contracept, not because this or that practice or method is somehow formative of their identity, but because contracepted sex would be a repudiation of their existence as human persons. They realize contraceptive acts are not the acts of human beings - they are they the acts of a consumer, using persons as mere products for the fulfillment of sterilized pleasure. And most of them understand these things, not from careful consideration of theological propositions, but from that lived experience which some commenters in this thread regard as a theological fetish. Indeed, most of them have gained these experiences in as "authentic" a manner as one could hope for, either through extensive use of contraceptives followed by non-contraceptive practices, or from hard and bitter divorces which resulted from contraceptively sterilized marriages.
While I do not expect that anecdotal evidence such as this will be sufficient to change the opinions of some on this matter, I hope that those who have expressed concern about the experiences of "real Catholics" on the issue will at least take time to meet, interact with, and understand the large and growing number of Catholics who have actual experience in the matters at hand."
"Having foundered on fundamental disagreements regarding first principles, it seems that this discussion has inevitably turned to an existential exchange of claims regarding the "authenticity" of Church doctrines on contraception, especially insofar as those doctrines have an "experiential" basis.
While a combox is rarely a suitable form for this sort of existential discourse (one's college dorm discussions at least took place with actual people, with whom one lived and regularly interacted), it seems that there is perhaps some benefit to discussing the "real" experiences of Catholics in regard to the matter. Moreover, it seems the commenters in this thread who seem the most concerned about "hearing the voices of women" on the issue, are in fact very poorly acquainted with any actual Catholics, men or women, who have accepted the Church's stance on these matters. With that in mind, I offer the following thoughts:
My wife is a cradle Catholic who grew up, like most women of her generation, being taught that "theological development [should be] based on the actual experiences of men and women rather than on the ideal experience that no one has." Upon leaving her parents' house, she followed that premise to its natural conclusion, and promptly left the Church, a pattern her two sisters repeated also, and which was shared by most women of their generation. Naturally, she rejected the Church's teaching on contraceptive acts, both in theory and in practice. However, a time came in her life when she was forced to re-evaluate her relationship to the Church, as well as consider the significance and status of its teachings on contraception. The interesting part of her story is that she was firm in her rejection of the former until careful study of the latter. Her reconciliation with the Church came only through an acceptance of the Church's teaching on the meaning of the marital act. Indeed, it was a close reading of Humanae Vitae (from a tract containing an introductory essay by the aforementioned Janet Smith) that first captured her moral imagination on the subject. In understanding the Church's teaching on the meaning of the human person, and its embodiment in the most intimate of human acts, as well as its "obstinacy" in the face of popular opinion on the matter, she came to realize that, just perhaps, the Church had a vision for human existence that is somewhat deeper than the cultural currents of our time.
We now live in a suburb of St Paul, MN, and she is connected to a wide network of Catholic familes, nearly all of whom accept the Church's teachings on contraception, with varying degrees of understanding and practice. Interestingly, the women and families with whom she is connected here make up the majority of mass-attending Catholics at their respective parishes, at least for their generational group. For none of them is the "rhythm method" the "sacred pillar of Catholic identity," and none of those women would recognize the snide and facile conflation of theology and practice that lies behind such remarks. Indeed, most of them are adamant about the fact that they do not practice the "rhythm method," and are equally adamant about the non-negotiable role of the Church's teachings on contraception, especially as it shapes their own lives and marital acts. Most of them see and understand, even if they cannot fully articulate it, the right order of theology and practice in this area, and choose to not contracept, not because this or that practice or method is somehow formative of their identity, but because contracepted sex would be a repudiation of their existence as human persons. They realize contraceptive acts are not the acts of human beings - they are they the acts of a consumer, using persons as mere products for the fulfillment of sterilized pleasure. And most of them understand these things, not from careful consideration of theological propositions, but from that lived experience which some commenters in this thread regard as a theological fetish. Indeed, most of them have gained these experiences in as "authentic" a manner as one could hope for, either through extensive use of contraceptives followed by non-contraceptive practices, or from hard and bitter divorces which resulted from contraceptively sterilized marriages.
While I do not expect that anecdotal evidence such as this will be sufficient to change the opinions of some on this matter, I hope that those who have expressed concern about the experiences of "real Catholics" on the issue will at least take time to meet, interact with, and understand the large and growing number of Catholics who have actual experience in the matters at hand."
Quebec, the Cube and the Cathedral, and Leo Strauss
George Weigel has a book called The Cube and the Cathedral, in which he uses two architectural landmarks in France as an analogy for the contrast between modernist-nihilist and cultural-religious visions of the world. When I was in Quebec two weeks ago, I discovered that the Old City district there has its own version of Weigel's analogy.
The first landmark is the site of the oldest market in North America, anchored by the Church of Notre-Dame-des-Victoires.
The second landmark lies a block or so down from the Church, and is a sculpture given as a gift from France to Quebec in 1987.
One of the more persistent questions of my life is to try and understand exactly how Western culture got from there to here. How does a culture come to the point where it decides to stop building churches, and starting building formless arrangments of aimless lines? It's not enough to simply trace the problem, as Weigel does, to 19th-century atheistic humanism and the ensuing rise of secularism. The problem must lie deeper than that, since after all, the 19th century cultural trends that Weigel deplores did not come from nowhere - they are themselves the product of other trends and cultural philosophies which must be explored if the full context of the problem is to be understood.
I do not pretend to have a full answer to the question posed by the cube and the church. I do think, though that one clue is provided by the purpose of La Grand Arche, the modernist cube referred to in Weigel's book. It is built to house the International Foundation for Human Rights. In other words, if we seek to understand the Cube, and why an entire culture would celebrate itself through such a monstrosity, it would perhaps be worth our time to understand what is intended by the phrase "human rights."
Which brings me to Leo Strauss, and his exploration of the modern doctrine of Human Rights, as explored in History and Natural Right. If Strauss' account is in any way correct, it seems that the anthropology and metaphysics implied in the modern doctrine of human rights is indeed in profound conflict with that authentic Catholic anthropology which leads to the building of churches. By tracing the problem back to early-modern philosophy, Strauss shows that the rise of 19th-century secularism is a direct descendant of philosophical trends that were on their face seemingly compatible with the existing Christian order, but in were actually in a position of radical discontinuity with that order. Of course, I would argue that this disconinuity has its roots in an even earlier time, which coincided roughly with the Renaissance, but that is a post for another time.
I would also note in passing that Catholics who consider themselves "politically conservative" generally accept Lockean natural right theory wholesale. A close reading of Strauss should make such persons a bit uncomfortable. I myself am generally appreciative of Edmund Burke, and found Strauss' critique of Burke to be rather intriguing, and a bit unsettling.
The first landmark is the site of the oldest market in North America, anchored by the Church of Notre-Dame-des-Victoires.
The second landmark lies a block or so down from the Church, and is a sculpture given as a gift from France to Quebec in 1987.
One of the more persistent questions of my life is to try and understand exactly how Western culture got from there to here. How does a culture come to the point where it decides to stop building churches, and starting building formless arrangments of aimless lines? It's not enough to simply trace the problem, as Weigel does, to 19th-century atheistic humanism and the ensuing rise of secularism. The problem must lie deeper than that, since after all, the 19th century cultural trends that Weigel deplores did not come from nowhere - they are themselves the product of other trends and cultural philosophies which must be explored if the full context of the problem is to be understood.
I do not pretend to have a full answer to the question posed by the cube and the church. I do think, though that one clue is provided by the purpose of La Grand Arche, the modernist cube referred to in Weigel's book. It is built to house the International Foundation for Human Rights. In other words, if we seek to understand the Cube, and why an entire culture would celebrate itself through such a monstrosity, it would perhaps be worth our time to understand what is intended by the phrase "human rights."
Which brings me to Leo Strauss, and his exploration of the modern doctrine of Human Rights, as explored in History and Natural Right. If Strauss' account is in any way correct, it seems that the anthropology and metaphysics implied in the modern doctrine of human rights is indeed in profound conflict with that authentic Catholic anthropology which leads to the building of churches. By tracing the problem back to early-modern philosophy, Strauss shows that the rise of 19th-century secularism is a direct descendant of philosophical trends that were on their face seemingly compatible with the existing Christian order, but in were actually in a position of radical discontinuity with that order. Of course, I would argue that this disconinuity has its roots in an even earlier time, which coincided roughly with the Renaissance, but that is a post for another time.
I would also note in passing that Catholics who consider themselves "politically conservative" generally accept Lockean natural right theory wholesale. A close reading of Strauss should make such persons a bit uncomfortable. I myself am generally appreciative of Edmund Burke, and found Strauss' critique of Burke to be rather intriguing, and a bit unsettling.
Leo Strauss, History and Natural Right - Chapter 5
[begin quote]
Locke is a hedonist: "That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely pleasure or pain." But his is a peculiar hedonism: "The greatest happiness consists" not in enjoying the greatest pleasures but "in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasures." It is not altogether an accident that the chapter in which these statements occur, and which happens to be the most extensive chapter of the whole Essay, is entitled "Power." For if, as Hobbes says, "the power of a man...is his present means, to obtain some future apparent good," Locke says in effect that the greatest happiness consists in the greatest power. Since there are no knowable natures, there is no nature of man with reference to which we could distinguish between pleasures which are according to nature and pleasures which are against nature, or between pleasures which are by nature higher and pleasures which are by nature lower: pleasure and pain are "for different men...very different things." Therefore, "the philosophers of old did in vain inquire, whether summum bonum consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation?" In the absence of a summum bonum, man would lack completely a star and compass for his life if there were no summum malum. "Desire is always moved by evil, to fly it." The strongest desire is the desire for self-preservation. The evil from which the strongest desire recoils is death. Death must then be the greatest evil: Not the natural sweetness of living but the terrors of death make us cling to life. What nature firmly establishes is that from which desire moves away, the point of departure of desire; the goal toward which desire moves is secondary. The primary fact is want. But this want, this lack, is no longer understood as pointing to something complete, perfect, whole. The necessities of life are no longer understood as necessary for the complete or good life, but as mere inescapabilities.The satisfaction of wants is therefore no longer limited by the demands of the good life but become aimless. The goal of desire is defined by nature only negatively - the denial of pain. It is not pleasure more or less dimly anticipated which elicits human efforts: "the chief, if not only, spur to human industry and action is uneasiness." So powerful is the natural primacy of pain that the active denial of pain is itself painful. The pain which removes pain is labor. It is this pain, and hence a defect, which gives man originally the most important of all rights: sufferings and defects, rather than merits or virtues, originate rights.[...]The painful relief of pain culminates not so much in the greatest pleasures as "in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasures." Life is the joyless quest for joy.
[end quote]
Emphases in bold are my own. While I have reservations about Strauss, I think that his account of Locke and the modern natural law tradition poses a serious challenge to any Catholic who wishes to defend both classical liberalism and traditional Catholic political doctrine, which is typically grounded in the Thomistic natural law concept.
Locke is a hedonist: "That which is properly good or bad, is nothing but barely pleasure or pain." But his is a peculiar hedonism: "The greatest happiness consists" not in enjoying the greatest pleasures but "in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasures." It is not altogether an accident that the chapter in which these statements occur, and which happens to be the most extensive chapter of the whole Essay, is entitled "Power." For if, as Hobbes says, "the power of a man...is his present means, to obtain some future apparent good," Locke says in effect that the greatest happiness consists in the greatest power. Since there are no knowable natures, there is no nature of man with reference to which we could distinguish between pleasures which are according to nature and pleasures which are against nature, or between pleasures which are by nature higher and pleasures which are by nature lower: pleasure and pain are "for different men...very different things." Therefore, "the philosophers of old did in vain inquire, whether summum bonum consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation?" In the absence of a summum bonum, man would lack completely a star and compass for his life if there were no summum malum. "Desire is always moved by evil, to fly it." The strongest desire is the desire for self-preservation. The evil from which the strongest desire recoils is death. Death must then be the greatest evil: Not the natural sweetness of living but the terrors of death make us cling to life. What nature firmly establishes is that from which desire moves away, the point of departure of desire; the goal toward which desire moves is secondary. The primary fact is want. But this want, this lack, is no longer understood as pointing to something complete, perfect, whole. The necessities of life are no longer understood as necessary for the complete or good life, but as mere inescapabilities.The satisfaction of wants is therefore no longer limited by the demands of the good life but become aimless. The goal of desire is defined by nature only negatively - the denial of pain. It is not pleasure more or less dimly anticipated which elicits human efforts: "the chief, if not only, spur to human industry and action is uneasiness." So powerful is the natural primacy of pain that the active denial of pain is itself painful. The pain which removes pain is labor. It is this pain, and hence a defect, which gives man originally the most important of all rights: sufferings and defects, rather than merits or virtues, originate rights.[...]The painful relief of pain culminates not so much in the greatest pleasures as "in the having those things which produce the greatest pleasures." Life is the joyless quest for joy.
[end quote]
Emphases in bold are my own. While I have reservations about Strauss, I think that his account of Locke and the modern natural law tradition poses a serious challenge to any Catholic who wishes to defend both classical liberalism and traditional Catholic political doctrine, which is typically grounded in the Thomistic natural law concept.
Train Across the St Croix River
There is one story and one story only
That will prove worth your telling,
Whether as learned bard or gifted child;
To it all lines or lesser gauds belong
That startle with their shining
Such common stories as they stray into.
Is it of trees you tell, their months and virtues,
Or strange beasts that beset you,
Of birds that croak at you the Triple will?
Or of the Zodiac and how slow it turns
Below the Boreal Crown,
Prison to all true kings that ever reigned?
Water to water, ark again to ark,
From woman back to woman:
So each new victim treads unfalteringly
The never altered circuit of his fate,
Bringing twelve peers as witness
Both to his starry rise and starry fall.
Or is it of the Virgin's silver beauty,
All fish below the thighs?
She in her left hand bears a leafy quince;
When, with her right hand she crooks a finger, smiling,
How many the King hold back?
Royally then he barters life for love.
Or of the undying snake from chaos hatched,
Whose coils contain the ocean,
Into whose chops with naked sword he springs,
Then in black water, tangled by the reeds,
Battles three days and nights,
To be spewed up beside her scalloped shore?
Much snow if falling, winds roar hollowly,
The owl hoots from the elder,
Fear in your heart cries to the loving-cup:
Sorrow to sorrow as the sparks fly upward.
The log groans and confesses:
There is one story and one story only.
Dwell on her graciousness, dwell on her smiling,
Do not forget what flowers
The great boar trampled down in ivy time.
Her brow was creamy as the crested wave,
Her sea-blue eyes were wild
But nothing promised that is not performed.
Robert Graves, "To Juan at the Winter Solstice"
Fr Adolphe Tanquerey - The Spiritual Life: A Treatise on Ascetic and Mystical Theology
II. Defects Born of Pride
"From the intellectual point of view, we think ourselves capable of approaching and solving the most difficult questions, or at least of undertaking studies which are beyond the reach of our talents. We easily persuade ourselves that we abound in judgement and wisdom, and instead of learning how to doubt, we settle with finality the most controverted questions."
As I further explore Leo Strauss, I have come to the realization that one of my comments below was a cheap and facile remark based on nothing other than my complete lack of familiarity with Strauss. It has been withdrawn accordingly.
I include the quote from Fr Tanquerey as a reminder to myself that doubt, properly understood, is one of the rarest and most difficult intellectual virtues to cultivate. I do not refer here to the more popular conception of "doubt," popular today in "Emergent" Evangelical circles and certain quarters of the Catholic world, where "doubt" is a signifier for emotional ambiquity regarding some tenet of the faith, and is typically used as an excuse for one's unwillingness to engage in the difficult tasks of shunning vice and cultivating virtue.
As Fr Tanquerey indicates here, doubt is nothing other than the virtue of humility applied to the operations of one's intellect, and whose particular focus is the relation of one's own judgements and opinions relative to those of others. May God grant us all the grace of such humility.
"From the intellectual point of view, we think ourselves capable of approaching and solving the most difficult questions, or at least of undertaking studies which are beyond the reach of our talents. We easily persuade ourselves that we abound in judgement and wisdom, and instead of learning how to doubt, we settle with finality the most controverted questions."
As I further explore Leo Strauss, I have come to the realization that one of my comments below was a cheap and facile remark based on nothing other than my complete lack of familiarity with Strauss. It has been withdrawn accordingly.
I include the quote from Fr Tanquerey as a reminder to myself that doubt, properly understood, is one of the rarest and most difficult intellectual virtues to cultivate. I do not refer here to the more popular conception of "doubt," popular today in "Emergent" Evangelical circles and certain quarters of the Catholic world, where "doubt" is a signifier for emotional ambiquity regarding some tenet of the faith, and is typically used as an excuse for one's unwillingness to engage in the difficult tasks of shunning vice and cultivating virtue.
As Fr Tanquerey indicates here, doubt is nothing other than the virtue of humility applied to the operations of one's intellect, and whose particular focus is the relation of one's own judgements and opinions relative to those of others. May God grant us all the grace of such humility.
Leo Strauss, History and Natural Right - Introduction
"This means that people were forced to accept a fundamental, typically modern, dualism of a nonteleological natural science and a teleological science of man. This is the position which the modern followers of Thomas Aquinas, among others, are forced to take, a position which presupposes a break with the comprehensive view of Aristotle, as well as that of Thomas Aquinas himself. The fundamental dilemma, in whose grip we are, is caused by the victory of modern science"
On the one hand, this little aside from the introduction describes quite nicely the situation of many modern Catholics. They have a two-story universe, as it were, where the physical or natural world serves no directed purpose or end, and can be engaged, used, or manipulated as each individual sees fit, since there is no ultimate purpose behind merely material things. Only the relatively small corner of the world known as "the human soul" is subject to purpose and meaning. Divine revelation and Divine law are directed only towards the interior world of the human soul, and the purely material world is left to fend for itself, as it were. Oddly enough, it can be argued that this peculiarly modern mindset is not a very Catholic one, since the very structure of sacramental theology supports the idea that physical objects are subject to Divine purposes and can reveal or even contain Divinity itself.
On the other hand, does any intelligent Thomist believe such a thing as Strauss says here? Just because scientific methods can very capably describe the efficient and material causes of the natural world, does that really mean that modern Thomists now exclude formal and final (i.e. teleological) causes from the explanation of the natural world? I smell a a whiff of old-fashioned Enlightment-era hyperrationalism in this particular passage. Richard Dawkins would be proud.
On the one hand, this little aside from the introduction describes quite nicely the situation of many modern Catholics. They have a two-story universe, as it were, where the physical or natural world serves no directed purpose or end, and can be engaged, used, or manipulated as each individual sees fit, since there is no ultimate purpose behind merely material things. Only the relatively small corner of the world known as "the human soul" is subject to purpose and meaning. Divine revelation and Divine law are directed only towards the interior world of the human soul, and the purely material world is left to fend for itself, as it were. Oddly enough, it can be argued that this peculiarly modern mindset is not a very Catholic one, since the very structure of sacramental theology supports the idea that physical objects are subject to Divine purposes and can reveal or even contain Divinity itself.
Summer Reading List
Here is what I plan to read this summer. I just finished a winter-long Aquinas reading project, so these are my "fun books." Sad, isn't it?
Leo Strauss, History and Natural Right
I've lately become interested in various critiques of Natural Law theory. Leo Strauss' account is supposedly one of the more penetrating, and he is apparently critical of both the Enlightenment-era natural law tradition as well as the Scholastic formulation. This is interesting to me, since, in my view, those two natural law theories are diametrically opposed. I'm very interested to hear what Strauss has to say.
This book also contains a fairly extended critique of historicism, and reading it is part of my effort to understand the influence of Hegel and all his disciples on Western thinking. I've seen several intelligent critiques of contemporary Catholic theology which rest on the proposition that modern Catholic theology is deeply (and erroneously) dependent on historicist assumptions. This book occasionally gets invoked in those critiques, so I am very curious to see what all the fuss is about.
Philip Rieff, Triumph of the Therapeutic
This is one of those books that I've read about for a long time, but never actually got around to putting eyes on paper. It is a classic work of cultural analysis, and, from what I hear, gives one of the most damning critiques of contemporary Western culture that can be found.
Germain Grisez, Contraception and Natural Law
I'm perpetually of two minds on whether or not the Church's teachings on contraception are more coherently explained by natural law theory or by JPII's more biblical-patristic account, commonly referred to as "Theology of the Body" (readers take note - I despise that phrase, and henceforth will not use it in this blog)
This intellectual waffling of mine, combined with my questions on natural law theory in general (see Leo Strauss above) should make for a interesting read.
Leo Steinberg, The Sexuality of Christ in Renaissance Art and in Modern Oblivion
Don't laugh. Several people for whom I have deep intellectual respect claim that this is one of the best books they've ever read.
As time permits, here's what else might be on tap:
Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being
Supposedly contains a defense of Aquinas from Heidegger's "ontotheology" critique. Marion also has a (perhaps undeserved?) reputation as a "postmodern" philosopher. Should be interesting.
If Wikipedia is any indication, Marion seems to intersect a number of topics that have been on my mind lately....patristics, neo-Platonism, ontology, phenomenology/Personalism, Aquinas, La Nouvelle Theologie...you name it, he seems to be connected to it somehow
George Bernanos, Diary of a Country Priest
I am woefully inadequate in my reading of good literature. This book has a good reputation amongst intelligent and orthodox Catholics.
Anonymous, Meditations on the Tarot
Written by Valentin Tomberg, a convert to the Church from neo-pagan esotericism. Forward by von Balthasar. How much weirder can you get? A perfect "beach read" for philosophy/theology nerds.
Leo Strauss, History and Natural Right
I've lately become interested in various critiques of Natural Law theory. Leo Strauss' account is supposedly one of the more penetrating, and he is apparently critical of both the Enlightenment-era natural law tradition as well as the Scholastic formulation. This is interesting to me, since, in my view, those two natural law theories are diametrically opposed. I'm very interested to hear what Strauss has to say.
This book also contains a fairly extended critique of historicism, and reading it is part of my effort to understand the influence of Hegel and all his disciples on Western thinking. I've seen several intelligent critiques of contemporary Catholic theology which rest on the proposition that modern Catholic theology is deeply (and erroneously) dependent on historicist assumptions. This book occasionally gets invoked in those critiques, so I am very curious to see what all the fuss is about.
Philip Rieff, Triumph of the Therapeutic
This is one of those books that I've read about for a long time, but never actually got around to putting eyes on paper. It is a classic work of cultural analysis, and, from what I hear, gives one of the most damning critiques of contemporary Western culture that can be found.
Germain Grisez, Contraception and Natural Law
I'm perpetually of two minds on whether or not the Church's teachings on contraception are more coherently explained by natural law theory or by JPII's more biblical-patristic account, commonly referred to as "Theology of the Body" (readers take note - I despise that phrase, and henceforth will not use it in this blog)
This intellectual waffling of mine, combined with my questions on natural law theory in general (see Leo Strauss above) should make for a interesting read.
Leo Steinberg, The Sexuality of Christ in Renaissance Art and in Modern Oblivion
Don't laugh. Several people for whom I have deep intellectual respect claim that this is one of the best books they've ever read.
As time permits, here's what else might be on tap:
Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being
Supposedly contains a defense of Aquinas from Heidegger's "ontotheology" critique. Marion also has a (perhaps undeserved?) reputation as a "postmodern" philosopher. Should be interesting.
If Wikipedia is any indication, Marion seems to intersect a number of topics that have been on my mind lately....patristics, neo-Platonism, ontology, phenomenology/Personalism, Aquinas, La Nouvelle Theologie...you name it, he seems to be connected to it somehow
George Bernanos, Diary of a Country Priest
I am woefully inadequate in my reading of good literature. This book has a good reputation amongst intelligent and orthodox Catholics.
Anonymous, Meditations on the Tarot
Written by Valentin Tomberg, a convert to the Church from neo-pagan esotericism. Forward by von Balthasar. How much weirder can you get? A perfect "beach read" for philosophy/theology nerds.
Catechism Catholicism
In recent months, there has been much discussion in the Catholic-oriented media about the possibility of a solemn papal declaration for the so-called"fifth Marian dogma"
Now I generally oppose this effort, not because the dogma is not true, but because it reinforces what I perceive to be a wholly negative trend in the modern Church, namely, the perceived dependence of Catholic dogma on papal authority. Included below is a portion of an email I sent to some friends discussing this issue. As I argue below, I think this trend in ecclesiology reinforces the more destructive trends occurring in the life of the modern Church.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Generally speaking, I "oppose" the declaration, not in the sense that I think it is untrue, but rather because I can't make real theological sense out of it, nor can I see how it would be a good idea, ecclesially speaking.
a) My current theological understanding is that the "mediatrix" and "co-redemptrix" titles derive from the common nature which the Blessed Virgin shares with Christ, and through which we were redeemed, receive grace, etc. I think this is the Thomist formulation, and I haven't seen any other strong arguments for the titles that aren't essentially lists of (necessarily imprecise) quotations from the liturgy, papal documents, etc.
Now the problem here is that if this is the theological basis for the mediatrix/redemptrix, then it would seem to be simply a consequence of an already-defined dogma, namely the theotokos. As such, it is hard for me to see the necessity of an additional dogmatic declaration.
Since canon law currently requires us to invoke Ratzinger in these types of discussions, I will additionally note that I believe this was part of Ratzinger's earlier views on the topic, namely that the doctrines, while true, are theologically vague and subject to confusing interpretation.
b) my second concern is a more practical one - I'm concerned that a papal declaration would simply reinforce the "pope = Catholic CEO" model of ecclesiology that seems to exist in the minds of modern Catholics...that is to say, can't we all just believe something without the pope having to officially say that it is true? The mediatrix and coredemptrix titles exist in the liturgy, they exist in tradition.....can't we just believe them, as part of the ordinary magisterium? Is there really a Marian crisis within the Church that requires solemn proclamation? Wouldn't a proclamation simply re-inforce one of the more negative trends in the modern Church, namely the phenomena of "Catechism Catholicism"...i.e. the attitude that "I believe doctrine X because the pope and the Catechism say so," as in opposition to sacred tradition and liturgy?
I think in some ways, too, that this phenomena of "Catechism Catholicism" is part of the ongoing story of the Church's struggle to fully understand the implications of Vatican I. Regarding Vatican I, it seems clear that a strong papal primacy is part of the dogmatic patrimony of the Church...but there is a strong argument to be made that the pronouncement came at a time when Catholic culture worldwide was in the initial stages of its collapse, due to the rise of secularism/modernism, etc......the strong formulation of papal primacy allowed the average Catholic, whose grasp of liturgy and tradition was becoming more tenuous, to begin formulating the Faith in more strictly hierarchical/monarchical terms. This led to the ecclesial mess we have today, where the average orthodox Catholic formulates their ecclesiology, not primarily with reference to Scripture, liturgy, tradition, but to "canon X of CCC", or "papal document y." This is the "pope=CEO of the Church" model of ecclesiology, and one sees it in both liberal and conservative factions...conservatives, when they say things like "I wish the pope would just fire Cdl Mahony," and in liberals when they say, "I wish the pope would hurry up and ordain women,gays,dogs, etc"
In some ways, even the cultural mess that followed Vatican II can be seen as part of the outgrowth of the development of "Catechism Catholicism." I think many of the Vatican II promulgations can be seen as an attempt to undo the mess caused by the misappropriation of Vat I teaching. Hence all the emphasis on the collegiality of bishops, and the function of the laity, and the returning of the liturgy to the people and their cultures, etc......all of which is well and good, except that the laity and bishops were in full-blown cultural collapse at the time. I don't think I need to elaborate on the many unfortunate results that came from the conjunction of V2 teaching with modern Western culture of the late 20th century...
To illustrate more clearly what I am referring to here, check out this blog post and its long chain of comments. It highlights quite nicely what I am trying to get across - namely, that misuse of the Petrine privilege can have the unintended effect of weakening the Church's authority. In the post, a conservative Catholic argues with a fairly standard paint-by-numbers liberal theologian over the subject of Church teaching.
The interesting thing is that the crux of the liberal theologian's argument for rejection of many critical Church teachings, such as Humanae Vitae (HV), is that they were not infallibly proclaimed, and thus subject to "development," by which he means "negation. And in a strict technical sense, he's correct - HV was not infallibly proclaimed.
It's an interesting exchange, because it shows how the misuse of dogmatic authority can contribute to all sorts of unforeseen problems. I think it would have been unfathomable to theologians 200+ years ago to make the argument that "well, it's not infallible, so we can believe what we want." Thus, one dogma (infallibility) is played off of another (contraception), because there is a mindset, rampant in both conservative and liberal circles, that the only important dogmas are ones defined from the extraordinary magisterium. The movement for the fifth Marian dogma only reinforces this unfortunate trend, in my opinion, since it seems to reinforce, this time from a "conservative" standpoint, the idea that that "it only really matters if the Pope says its true!"
Now I generally oppose this effort, not because the dogma is not true, but because it reinforces what I perceive to be a wholly negative trend in the modern Church, namely, the perceived dependence of Catholic dogma on papal authority. Included below is a portion of an email I sent to some friends discussing this issue. As I argue below, I think this trend in ecclesiology reinforces the more destructive trends occurring in the life of the modern Church.
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Generally speaking, I "oppose" the declaration, not in the sense that I think it is untrue, but rather because I can't make real theological sense out of it, nor can I see how it would be a good idea, ecclesially speaking.
a) My current theological understanding is that the "mediatrix" and "co-redemptrix" titles derive from the common nature which the Blessed Virgin shares with Christ, and through which we were redeemed, receive grace, etc. I think this is the Thomist formulation, and I haven't seen any other strong arguments for the titles that aren't essentially lists of (necessarily imprecise) quotations from the liturgy, papal documents, etc.
Now the problem here is that if this is the theological basis for the mediatrix/redemptrix, then it would seem to be simply a consequence of an already-defined dogma, namely the theotokos. As such, it is hard for me to see the necessity of an additional dogmatic declaration.
Since canon law currently requires us to invoke Ratzinger in these types of discussions, I will additionally note that I believe this was part of Ratzinger's earlier views on the topic, namely that the doctrines, while true, are theologically vague and subject to confusing interpretation.
b) my second concern is a more practical one - I'm concerned that a papal declaration would simply reinforce the "pope = Catholic CEO" model of ecclesiology that seems to exist in the minds of modern Catholics...that is to say, can't we all just believe something without the pope having to officially say that it is true? The mediatrix and coredemptrix titles exist in the liturgy, they exist in tradition.....can't we just believe them, as part of the ordinary magisterium? Is there really a Marian crisis within the Church that requires solemn proclamation? Wouldn't a proclamation simply re-inforce one of the more negative trends in the modern Church, namely the phenomena of "Catechism Catholicism"...i.e. the attitude that "I believe doctrine X because the pope and the Catechism say so," as in opposition to sacred tradition and liturgy?
I think in some ways, too, that this phenomena of "Catechism Catholicism" is part of the ongoing story of the Church's struggle to fully understand the implications of Vatican I. Regarding Vatican I, it seems clear that a strong papal primacy is part of the dogmatic patrimony of the Church...but there is a strong argument to be made that the pronouncement came at a time when Catholic culture worldwide was in the initial stages of its collapse, due to the rise of secularism/modernism, etc......the strong formulation of papal primacy allowed the average Catholic, whose grasp of liturgy and tradition was becoming more tenuous, to begin formulating the Faith in more strictly hierarchical/monarchical terms. This led to the ecclesial mess we have today, where the average orthodox Catholic formulates their ecclesiology, not primarily with reference to Scripture, liturgy, tradition, but to "canon X of CCC", or "papal document y." This is the "pope=CEO of the Church" model of ecclesiology, and one sees it in both liberal and conservative factions...conservatives, when they say things like "I wish the pope would just fire Cdl Mahony," and in liberals when they say, "I wish the pope would hurry up and ordain women,gays,dogs, etc"
In some ways, even the cultural mess that followed Vatican II can be seen as part of the outgrowth of the development of "Catechism Catholicism." I think many of the Vatican II promulgations can be seen as an attempt to undo the mess caused by the misappropriation of Vat I teaching. Hence all the emphasis on the collegiality of bishops, and the function of the laity, and the returning of the liturgy to the people and their cultures, etc......all of which is well and good, except that the laity and bishops were in full-blown cultural collapse at the time. I don't think I need to elaborate on the many unfortunate results that came from the conjunction of V2 teaching with modern Western culture of the late 20th century...
To illustrate more clearly what I am referring to here, check out this blog post and its long chain of comments. It highlights quite nicely what I am trying to get across - namely, that misuse of the Petrine privilege can have the unintended effect of weakening the Church's authority. In the post, a conservative Catholic argues with a fairly standard paint-by-numbers liberal theologian over the subject of Church teaching.
The interesting thing is that the crux of the liberal theologian's argument for rejection of many critical Church teachings, such as Humanae Vitae (HV), is that they were not infallibly proclaimed, and thus subject to "development," by which he means "negation. And in a strict technical sense, he's correct - HV was not infallibly proclaimed.
It's an interesting exchange, because it shows how the misuse of dogmatic authority can contribute to all sorts of unforeseen problems. I think it would have been unfathomable to theologians 200+ years ago to make the argument that "well, it's not infallible, so we can believe what we want." Thus, one dogma (infallibility) is played off of another (contraception), because there is a mindset, rampant in both conservative and liberal circles, that the only important dogmas are ones defined from the extraordinary magisterium. The movement for the fifth Marian dogma only reinforces this unfortunate trend, in my opinion, since it seems to reinforce, this time from a "conservative" standpoint, the idea that that "it only really matters if the Pope says its true!"
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